North Korean troops have been captured in Russia’s war. Can they end up in South Korea?

The Russia-Ukraine war, now in its third year, has entered a critical new phase following Pyongyang and Moscow’s official acknowledgment in late April 2025 of North Korean troop deployment alongside Russian forces.

The acknowledgment transitions Pyongyang from a covert actor to an official belligerent, impacting diplomatic and legal considerations surrounding the conflict — including the fate of North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) captured by Ukraine.

International law typically requires repatriation post-conflict, but credible evidence suggests severe human rights abuses await these soldiers if returned to North Korea, making potential repatriation a significant humanitarian and diplomatic flashpoint.

The timing is particularly delicate due to ongoing ceasefire negotiations initiated by the Donald Trump administration. The U.S. president, following a call with Russian President Vladimir Putin Monday, announced Moscow and Kyiv had agreed to “immediately” start ceasefire negotiations. However, the Kremlin hasn’t set forth a timeline.

South Korean intelligence estimates that approximately 4,700 of the 15,000 North Korean troops sent to Russia have been killed or injured as of April 30, with around 600 fatalities confirmed. Two soldiers are known to have been captured alive by Ukrainian forces, and at least one explicitly stated his intent to seek asylum in South Korea through an interview with local media.

If emerging media reports and testimonies from captured North Korean soldiers are confirmed, the North Korean military’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war could expose significant human rights violations, particularly abuses committed by Pyongyang against its own personnel. Experts note that such an unprecedented situation, where North Korea’s human rights practices are playing out openly on the international stage, underscores the urgency of addressing these abuses not merely as legal or diplomatic issues but as fundamental violations of universal human dignity.

Complications in POW repatriation

The status of these POWs, captured in February near the Kursk frontline, has become a critical test case.

One soldier, identified only as Ri, said he “made up my mind about 80 percent” on repatriating to South Korea. Another, surnamed Baek, indicated he is “considering” it.

Unlike typical POW or asylum cases involving foreign nationals, North Korean defectors are regarded by South Korean law as citizens of the Republic of Korea, based on Article 3 of the Constitution. This allows Seoul to pursue resettlement for the soldiers as returning nationals.

However, in practice, when defections occur via third countries, as in the cases of Ri and Baek, international legal procedures and the cooperation of host nations are still crucial.

Seoul has quietly coordinated with Kyiv regarding the potential transfer of these POWs.

The South Korean ministries of Foreign Affairs and Unification affirmed their willingness to provide protection and support under international humanitarian standards. Kyiv’s Defense Intelligence Directorate has expressed openness to collaborating closely with Seoul.

However, North Korea’s official combatant status complicates the situation.

According to Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention, POWs must be repatriated to their home country after hostilities end. If North Korea insists on repatriation, supported by Russia, Ukraine may face pressure to comply, especially considering recent POW exchange agreements between the two primary belligerents, including an agreement on a 1,000-for-1,000 prisoner swap made in Istanbul on May 16.

South Korea insists POWs’ personal wishes must be prioritized, citing severe human rights violations likely to be faced upon their return. However, Ukrainian officials may hesitate to prioritize the asylum of North Korean troops over the exchange of their own nationals.

Legal grounds for nonrepatriation

International law provides grounds to oppose forced repatriation when substantial human rights abuses are anticipated.

Historical precedents, such as during the 1950-53 Korean War, saw large-scale POW repatriation refusals, prompting the United Nations General Assembly to recognize exceptions in extraordinary circumstances. The International Committee of the Red Cross further clarified in 2020 that repatriation obligations can be exempted if returning prisoners face significant human rights violations in their home country.

Human rights reports, including testimonies documented in the North Korean Human Rights White Paper, consistently indicate severe punishment — ranging from imprisonment to execution — for individuals attempting defection. This risk is heightened for the captured soldiers who have openly expressed their intent to defect — especially with their identities now revealed.

Alleged human rights violations during deployment

Captured North Korean soldiers’ testimonies reveal potential severe abuses committed by Pyongyang during deployment.

Soldiers were reportedly deceived, believing they were sent abroad for training rather than combat.

Ri said in the interview that he was under the impression he was going overseas as a student trainee and only realized his combat role upon arrival in Kursk. Baek said he had not seen his mother in four years and that she was unaware of his deployment to Russia.

“That is why this deployment to Russia strongly bears the characteristics of forced conscription,” said Oh Gyeong-seob, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, at the 2025 International Conference on North Korean Human Rights hosted by the Unification Ministry on Monday in Yeouido, western Seoul.

Kim In-tae, a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy and a defector himself, emphasized the deployment’s constitutional illegality under North Korean law.

“There cannot be any arbitrary overseas deployment, and the North Korean constitution states that the mission of the Korean People’s Army is to defend the country’s [sovereignty and the social system],” he said.

Citing a statement issued by Pyongyang’s Party Central Military Committee on April 27, Kim added, “It is written that ‘Kim Jong-un decided on the participation of the armed forces and notified the Russian side,’ as well as ‘in accordance with the order of the Head of State,’” highlighting that the deployment decision was made solely by Kim Jong-un.

Reports also allege severe abuses, including the deployment of execution squads to prevent desertions.

“During combat, many human rights violations occurred,” Oh said. “According to multiple testimonies and reports, wounded soldiers were allegedly executed by their comrades or ordered to kill themselves before capture. If verified, this would constitute arbitrary execution and a gross violation of the right to life.”

Additionally, suspicions of economic exploitation, similar to conditions faced by North Korean overseas laborers whose earnings are confiscated at rates of “80 to 90 percent” by Pyongyang, raise concerns over forced labor and exploitation.

Bringing Kim Jong-un to the ICC

Legal experts argue that North Korea’s acknowledgment significantly strengthens the case for prosecuting Kim Jong-un as a co-conspirator in war crimes alongside Putin at the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The ICC has classified Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an act of unlawful aggression in violation of the United Nations Charter. Under the Rome Statute that governs the ICC, the crime of aggression is defined as a leadership offense — holding top state decision-makers accountable for unlawful acts of war.

“I think that time is ripe to bring Kim Jong-un before the ICC,” Song Sang-hyun, a former ICC president, said, adding, “Ukraine now has a nice legal standing to pursue an ICC case against the North Korean leader.”

He emphasized that the ICC prosecutor also has the authority to initiate an independent investigation ex officio, potentially bypassing some political hurdles if credible evidence is presented.

“The most severe punitive effect is that an ICC arrest warrant has no statute of limitations, meaning the accused must carry the stigma for life, which itself is a significant psychological punishment,” Song said. He further explained that suspects indicted by the ICC effectively face international isolation “as they are prohibited from setting foot in any of the 124 ICC member countries.”


Is troop deployment a human rights issue? 

Despite widespread condemnation, Prof. Brian Myers of Dongseo University’s Department of International Studies expressed skepticism over framing North Korea’s troop deployment primarily as a human rights violation.

“We must also admit that the legal grounds for criticizing the deployment on human rights terms are weaker,” Myers said.

He highlighted combatants’ legal status as legitimate military targets, complicating human rights arguments, while noting that the soldiers’ lack of preparation is standard military practice, and questioned the moral framing of criticizing such conditions.

“Even if the Kim regime were sending ill-prepared fighters to Kursk, it would be odd to lament this on human-rights grounds,” he said. “Do we want it to train more efficient killers of Ukrainians?”

Myers suggested that the international community instead leverage psychological strategies that exploit contradictions within North Korean ideology.

“North Koreans have long been taught that self-reliance is the highest collective virtue and that South Korea is subservient to the United States,” Myers explained. “Images of North Korean soldiers taking orders from Russians could significantly unsettle ordinary citizens, providing an avenue for effective psychological operations.”

By framing Kim’s military collaboration with Russia as humiliating to North Korean sovereignty, Myers argued, international pressure could significantly undermine the regime’s internal narrative and stability.

BY SEO JI-EUN   [seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr]