U.S. bombing of Iran might convince North Korea it was right to build nukes

[NEWS ANALYSIS]

When the United States bombed deep into Iran’s nuclear heartland, it was a show of force aimed at halting Iran’s nuclear trajectory for Washington. But for Pyongyang, it was a flashing red light.

The U.S. military on June 21 launched precision strikes on three of Iran’s most fortified underground nuclear facilities — Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan — in what President Donald Trump hailed as a “spectacular military success.”

North Korea was quick to respond.

On June 23, it issued a rare Foreign Ministry statement condemning the U.S. strike as a grave violation of international law, while carefully avoiding any direct provocation — a measured response analysts say reflects Pyongyang’s desire to avoid being seen as the next target.

Yet, rather than serving as a deterrence message for Pyongyang, experts say that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, long convinced that nuclear weapons are the ultimate insurance policy for regime survival, likely interprets the U.S. strike on Iran as further justification for accelerating its nuclear and missiles weapons program and deepening military ties with Russia and China.

Despite structural parallels, a similar strike on North Korea is seen as far less likely. Experts point to Pyongyang’s possession of dozens of nuclear warheads, codified first-use doctrine and the immediate threat of devastating retaliation on Seoul and U.S. bases as key deterrents to any U.S. military action.

A message and a threat

North Korea’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson “strongly denounced” the U.S. attack “severely violated” the UN Charter and international law and accused Washington of endangering global stability in a statement published on June 23.

The statement criticized Israel and the West, blaming the Middle East crisis on Israel’s “reckless valor” and what it called the West’s enabling of Tel Aviv’s unilateral ambitions.

Given that Pyongyang released the condemnation in a Q&A format with a ministry spokesperson rather than a higher-level official or central party organ, analysts say it reflects a deliberate lowering of rhetorical intensity.

“By delivering its response through a mid-level spokesperson, North Korea is distancing itself from direct linkage to the Iran situation,” said Yang Moo-jin, president at the University of North Korean Studies. “This is also a way to deflect the narrative of ‘Iran today, North Korea tomorrow’ and to push back against comparisons between the two.”

North Korea’s ruling elite has long emphasized nuclear weapons as its ultimate guarantee against foreign intervention.

With an estimated arsenal of 40 to 50 nuclear warheads and multiple intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the United States, Pyongyang already has the means to inflict devastating retaliation — not only against South Korea and U.S. military bases in Japan and Guam, but potentially even against the U.S. mainland. But the Iran strike still serves as a sharp reminder of U.S. capabilities, especially against underground facilities like those in North Korea.

From Pyongyang’s perspective, the Iran operation may be interpreted as reinforcing the belief that the only reason the United States was willing to carry out pre-emptive strikes on hardened sites in Iran was because Tehran possessed no nuclear weapons.

Analysts say Kim’s regime will likely respond by doubling down on its deterrent posture.

Lim Eul-chul, professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, says that North Korea’s foreign policy — centered on regime survival through nuclear armament — will be “fundamentally reinforced” by the Iran strike.

“The strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities is likely to catalyze changes in North Korea’s external policy, particularly by accelerating and deepening military cooperation with Russia,” Lim said.

For instance, Russian President Vladimir Putin has already signaled expanded defense cooperation with North Korea, including technology and equipment transfers. In practical terms, this could mean North Korea incorporating more Russian defenses — like antiaircraft systems or electronic warfare — and training alongside Russian units.

North Korea recently deployed thousands of troops to Russia for the Ukraine war and reportedly supplied Moscow with artillery and missiles.

Those battlefield exchanges have likely given Kim’s generals new insights — and concerns — about aerial and missile warfare. Seeing how Israel’s advanced F-35 jets and drones overcame Iran’s air defenses, Pyongyang may push even harder to improve its own antiaircraft and missile shield, possibly with Russian assistance.

Why striking North Korea isn’t like Iran

North Korea prides itself on having achieved what Iran has not: a deliverable nuclear arsenal.

Pyongyang, in its last underground nuclear test in 2017, succeeded in miniaturizing warheads, and its ICBMs could put the U.S. mainland in reach. In theory, this should have cemented its status as untouchable by American strikes.

Experts caution that Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons also make it a far more lethal target than Iran was.

Former Pentagon official Michael Green notes in a commentary that in Kim’s case, “Pyongyang already had an extensive arsenal of [ …] artillery tubes and missile launchers pointed at Seoul” before it even developed nukes. In other words, attacking North Korea — even just its nukes — risks instant, massive retaliation.

And since September 2022, Pyongyang codified a nuclear law that authorizes pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes under broad conditions. Unlike Iran — which is a non-nuclear state — North Korea legally permits nuclear use even against conventional military attacks, meaning that any U.S. strike could immediately trigger a North Korean first-use response under its doctrine.

North Korea’s key sites, like the Yongbyon reactor and Kangson enrichment facility, are deeply buried and widely dispersed.

Military experts believe even massive bunker-busting bombs might not entirely eliminate them. A strike could degrade but likely not destroy the program, possibly provoking an all-out nuclear or chemical counterattack if Kim feels cornered.

Given these factors, analysts agree that a unilateral U.S. strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities would be far riskier than the Iran operation.

It would likely require full coordination with Seoul; acting alone could shatter the South Korea-U.S. alliance and trigger domestic backlash.

South Korea’s capital, Seoul, sits only up to 50 kilometers from the heavily fortified demilitarized zone (DMZ) and is within range of thousands of North Korean artillery tubes and shorter-range missiles. In a worst-case scenario, Kim’s forces might retaliate with conventional barrages or even chemical weapons on South Korean cities.

Russian intervention — as guarantor in their June 2024 mutual defense treaty — or Chinese intervention — as Kim’s top ally — could quickly escalate a regional strike into a global crisis.

A diplomatic balancing act for Seoul

Amid this volatile situation, Seoul is walking a diplomatic tightrope.

President Lee Jae Myung scrapped plans to attend the NATO summit in The Hague this week, citing pressing domestic issues and the “uncertainties stemming from the situation in the Middle East” after the Iranian strikes. Instead, his government will send a lower-level delegation and brief NATO partners privately on North Korea’s latest moves, such as its troop dispatch to Russia.

The Lee administration has underscored a two-track strategy: deterrence through the U.S. alliance, while keeping diplomatic channels open to Pyongyang.

In his inauguration speech, Lee pledged to pursue dialogue with the North “from a position of strength,” and officials have floated reviving U.S.-led multilateral talks as conditions allow.

At the same time, Seoul is reinforcing its military preparedness in lockstep with Washington.

For example, U.S. pressure for higher defense spending is nothing new — Trump recently urged Asian allies to aim to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense — and Lee will have to balance those demands while safeguarding South Korea’s interests.

On the diplomatic front, Seoul has stressed that the Iran strike underscores the global stakes of nuclear proliferation.

Lee’s office announced that officials will use forums like NATO to highlight that Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions now have ripple effects far beyond Northeast Asia.

Seoul also recognizes that Washington’s extended deterrence may not be permanent.

Recent U.S. signals — from troop withdrawal hints to blunt negotiations on alliance costs — leave South Korea eager to diversify its security options. Economic levers, intelligence-sharing with allies, and regional partnerships will all be part of Seoul’s hedging strategy.

“The rapidly changing international environment triggered by the U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities has exposed the limitations of conventional, routine diplomatic approaches,” Lim said. “To manage security on the Korean Peninsula and broader global crises, we need a bold and creative diplomatic strategy of a different caliber.”