Experts advise that Korea highlight its record as a responsible user of nuclear energy and a trusted ally, and stress its ability to strengthen U.S. nuclear power competitiveness, support the international nonproliferation regime, and reduce reliance on Russian and Chinese reactors.
![U.S. President Donald Trump meets with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung at the Oval Office, at the White House, in Washington, D.C., U.S., August 25, 2025. [REUTERS]](https://www.koreadailyus.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Trump-LeeJaeMyung.jpg)
The Korean government is pushing to revise the nuclear accord early, despite 10 years remaining before its expiration. As a fallback, it is also exploring ways to secure maximum authority under the current agreement.
“We have long felt the need to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and to produce our own fuel through enrichment,” Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said in a media interview on September 4. “We should pursue this either by revising the agreement or by reaching another form of accord with the United States.”
The 2015 revision of the Korea-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement permits Korea to enrich uranium to less than 20 percent, provided that both sides sign a written commitment through the High-Level Bilateral Commission (HLBC). In practice, U.S. approval is required, and no progress has been made in the past decade. The deal also bans the reprocessing of spent fuel.
While the agreement theoretically allows enrichment under U.S. approval or with non-U.S. materials and equipment, Korea has not pursued these options due to alliance considerations. Pyroprocessing, also known as dry reprocessing, is limited under strict conditions.
Scholars argue that energy security also requires change.
“Korea currently operates 26 nuclear reactors and imports all of its fuel, more than 30 percent of which comes from Russia,” said Lee Byung-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies. “Given the protracted war in Ukraine, Korea needs at least limited enrichment rights for energy security.”
![U.S. President Donald Trump, left, welcomes President Lee Jae Myung at the White House in Washington on Aug. 25. [REUTERS]](https://www.koreadailyus.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/0909-Trump.jpg)
The fate of any revision ultimately lies with U.S. President Trump. Under the agreement, either country’s leader can suspend implementation for reasons of nuclear proliferation or national security and must notify the other in writing.
“In a structure where President Trump holds full authority, the fact that the issue reached the summit level marks meaningful progress,” a Korean government source said. “The State Department and Energy Department will have to conduct a full review.”
The HLBC, which was created in 2015 but has not met since 2018, may resume soon.
The body stalled under former President Moon Jae-in’s nuclear phaseout policy and disputes over intellectual property between U.S. and Korean nuclear companies. At the May 2022 summit, former presidents Yoon Suk Yeol and Joe Biden reaffirmed their intent to restart the HLBC, but it has not convened since.
As discussions on expanding Korea’s nuclear authority continue from the summit level to working-level talks, the key issue has become what strategy Seoul will present to Washington.
The government argues that, as in shipbuilding, Korea can be the optimal partner for reviving the nuclear industry and is urging the United States to ease restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing. Some analysts also stress that revising the agreement would not undermine but instead strengthen the U.S. nonproliferation framework.
“Securing enrichment and reprocessing rights aligns with U.S. national interests and its nonproliferation strategy,” Rep. Kim Gunn of the People Power Party, who served as deputy negotiator in the 2015 talks, said. “It is not in Washington’s interest for the world to depend on Russian and Chinese reactors. France, another nuclear power, has declared technological independence from the United States, but this has led to a decline in competitiveness. Korea is now the only reliable partner that can work with U.S. technology.”
Still, granting such rights to Korea could trigger demands from other allies. Saudi Arabia, for example, sought nuclear cooperation without the so-called “gold standard,” which bars enrichment and reprocessing, while pursuing normalization with Israel.
Korea avoided the gold standard in the 2015 revision, but if it wins partial rights to enrichment and reprocessing, other U.S. partners may demand the same.
