![A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) launched by North Korea in March 2021 referred to as the ″North Korean Iskander″ [YONHAP]](https://www.koreadailyus.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/0508-missile.jpg)
While Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin are expected to attend a high-profile parade in Moscow’s Red Square alongside other leaders from friendly nations, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un opted to stage a missile provocation instead.
The move appears aimed at asserting North Korea’s presence to both its anti-Western allies and the United States.
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the missiles were fired between 8:10 a.m. and 9:20 a.m. from the Wonsan area in Gangwon Province, flying up to 800 kilometers (497.1 miles) in a northeasterly direction toward waters beyond the East Sea’s Al Island.
Military officials believe the launch likely involved a combination of the KN-23 and KN-25 — North Korean variants of the Russian Iskander and a 600 mm superlarge multiple rocket launcher, respectively. The KN-24, often grouped with these in what analysts call North Korea’s “SRBM trio,” was not confirmed in the launch.
A JCS official said that South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies had detected preparations for the missile launches in advance, and shared postlaunch analysis with the United States and Japan. The military continues to monitor for potential further provocations.
This marks the North’s first ballistic missile launch in nearly two months, following its March 10 launch of close-range ballistic missiles (CRBMs) from Hwangju, North Hwanghae. It is also the second such provocation since the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump’s second administration.
The timing of the launch — just one day before Russia’s May 9 military parade — draws further attention. As Russia pushes for diplomatic gains following the recapture of most of Kursk and as cease-fire negotiations intensify, Putin has placed particular emphasis on this year’s Victory Day. Leaders from several pro-Russian countries, including Xi, are expected to attend.
By launching missiles on the eve of this geopolitical “mega-event,” North Korea appears to have staged a show of force amid a gathering of the anti-Western bloc in Moscow.
Hyun Seung-soo, deputy head of the Korea Institute for National Unification, said the provocation may have been Kim’s way of aligning with anti-U.S. solidarity led by China and Russia, despite his absence from the event.
However, questions remain about the depth of North Korea’s solidarity with Russia. Despite the event’s significance, Kim has not sent a high-level delegation to Moscow. Intelligence officials had predicted that Choe Ryong-hae, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, might attend, but the role appears to have gone to Sin Hong-chol, North Korea’s ambassador to Russia.
![In this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency, a strategic cruise missile is being test-fired from an unspecified location in North Korea on Jan. 25. [YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/05/08/7d359433-e3d6-41fc-8150-dd2705026365.jpg)
State media in North Korea have also offered minimal coverage of the Victory Day event, raising speculation that Pyongyang may be expressing dissatisfaction over insufficient returns from its military support for Russia, particularly in light of reports that North Korean weapons were used in the battle for Kursk.
This backdrop supports the interpretation that Kim’s missile provocation was designed to boost visibility not just toward the United States but also within the anti-Western coalition.
On April 30, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service reported to the National Assembly that North Korea is attempting to improve ties with China as a hedge against risks surrounding the potential end of the war in Ukraine, but that Beijing continues to exert control over Pyongyang, keeping relations in a stalemate.
Kim’s decision to skip the Moscow podium and instead draw attention through missile launches appears to be in line with his longstanding strategy of provocation.
Still, experts caution against interpreting Kim’s absence or the missile launch as a sign of fundamental strain in Pyongyang’s ties with Moscow. North Korea continues to demonstrate a clear intent to align with the anti-U.S. front led by Russia. With possible dialogue with Washington still on the horizon, Kim likely sees value in maintaining Russian backing — even if tensions or dissatisfaction persist.
![A Belarusian government delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Shuleiko arrived in Pyongyang on May 6 to attend the third meeting of the DPRK-Belarus Intergovernmental Commission for Trade and Economic Cooperation, North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency reported Tuesday. [YONHAP]](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/data/photo/2025/05/08/25f0eb97-2892-4d7c-91c5-738a518b9f6f.jpg)
North Korean media have recently given prominent coverage to the visit of a Belarusian delegation to Pyongyang, led by Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Shuleiko.
According to Rodong Sinmun, North Korea hosted a banquet at Mansudae Assembly Hall on Wednesday and held sectoral meetings as part of the 3rd session of the Joint Committee for Trade and Economic Cooperation, discussing detailed plans for future collaboration.
North Korea’s recent state media emphasis on Kim’s visits to munitions factories — including those producing tanks, artillery shells and machinery — along with the SRBM launch, could also be interpreted as a defense industry showcase aimed at countries aligned with Russia. The missiles launched on Thursday are believed to be the same models tested in real combat conditions on the battlefield in Kursk.